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Abstract  
 
Virtualization is a very popular solution to many problems 
in datacenter management. It offers increased utilization of 
existing system resources through effective consolidation, 
negating the need for more servers and additional rack 
space. Furthermore, it offers essential capabilities in terms of 
disaster recovery and potential savings on energy and main-
tenance costs. However, these benefits may be tempered by 
the increased complexities of securing virtual infrastructure. 
Do the benefits of virtualization outweigh the risks? In this 
study, the authors evaluated the functionalities of the basic 
components of virtual datacenters, identified the major risks 
to the data infrastructure, and present here several solutions 
for overcoming potential threats to virtual infrastructure. 
 
Introduction 
 
 The past few years have seen a steady increase in the use 
of virtualization in corporate datacenters. Virtualization can 
be described as the creation of computer environments 
within operating systems allowing multiple virtual servers to 
run on a single physical computer. Many datacenters have 
adopted this architecture to increase the utilization of avail-
able system resources, which resulted in a decreased need 
for additional servers and rack space. There are substantial 
savings in energy, cooling, administration and maintenance 
expenses. But these advantages are somewhat tempered by 
the additional complexities, performance and security com-
plications in virtualization environments. According to a 
recent survey from 531 IT professionals [1], concerns about 
security was considered one of the top issues in adopting 
virtual technology (43%) and the main reason that organiza-
tions were slow in the deployment of virtualization (55%).  
It is therefore necessary to examine the security risks associ-
ated with virtualization and the potential countermeasures. 
 
 Presented here are the key components that make up a 
virtual datacenter, followed by the analysis of virtualization 
security threats including virtual machine security, hypervi-
sor security, network storage concerns, and virtual center 
security. Finally, the authors present possible solutions, 
guidelines and recommendations for enhancing security in 
virtualized datacenters. 
 
 
 
Components of Virtual Datacenters 
  
 Virtual technologies have a broad range of contexts: oper-
ating Systems (OS), programming languages and computer 
architecture [12]. Virtualization of OS and computer archi-
tecture significantly benefits any disaster-recovery process 
and improves business continuity due to the fact that images 
of virtual machines can be quickly restored from different 
physical servers without waiting on the hardware repair. A 
virtual datacenter is a type of infrastructure that allows for 
sharing physical resources of multiple physical servers 
across an enterprise. This aggregation of resources becomes 
feasible when a suite of virtualization software is installed 
on the various components such as physical servers, network 
storage and others. As shown in Figure 1, the major ele-
ments of the virtualized datacenter include virtual machines, 
hypervisors, network resources, and datastores – Network 
Attached Storage (NAS), Storage Attached Network (SAN) 
and IP Storage Attached Network (IP SAN).  
 
 
Figure 1. Datacenter components 
 
It should be noted that this discussion of virtual infrastruc-
ture is independent of specific brands of virtualization suites. 
Different virtualization venders tend to use different names 
when referencing the various components, although they all 
equate to the same basic principles. 
 
A. Virtual Machines 
 
The concept of virtualization is not new. It is based on a 
time-sharing concept originally developed by scientists at 
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the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in 1961 
[2]. Time-sharing creates an opportunity for concurrently 
managing multi-hardware and multi-user environments on a 
single physical machine. Today, many vendors such as IBM, 
VMware, Oracle, HP and others have taken this time-sharing 
concept even further and developed virtualization schemes 
of various types including Integrity VM by HP [5]. The ad-
vantages of modern technologies such as Integrity VM allow 
any operating system to run inside VM that supports the 
Integrity VM platform. An example of how virtualization is 
applied in a hosted virtualization model is shown by Figure 
2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Hosted approach for virtual servers 
Source: Adapted from [4] 
 
 Virtual machines (VMs) are sets of files that support oper-
ating systems and applications independent of a host operat-
ing system. Typical VMs include BIOS, configuration and 
disk files. In other words, they are software-only implemen-
tations of computers that execute programs just like conven-
tional systems. Figure 3 lists a number of examples of VMs 
containing virtual hardware components such as CPU, 
memory, hard drives, network adapters and many others.  
 
 
Figure 3. Elements of Virtual Machines 
 
 Nowadays, the detection of a virtualized OS is a fairly 
new technique, so most virtual OS environments are not 
detected by common operating systems such as Windows 
XP, Vista, and a few Linux operating systems. This offers a 
great deal of flexibility in the deployment of virtual infra-
structures. Another essential property of virtual machines is 
OS isolation – if a virtual computer gets infected with a virus 
other virtual machines should not get infected. Popek and 
Goldberg [8] describe a virtual machine as “an efficient, 
isolated duplicate of a real machine.”  
 
 It is possible to run multiple virtual machines on a single 
physical server without any interaction between operating 
systems. Thus, if a virtual machine crashes, it would not 
affect the performance of the other virtual machines on the 
same physical server. Because of these properties, virtual 
machines are considered one of the building blocks of virtu-
alized datacenters. 
 
B. Hypervisors 
 
 A hypervisor, also known as physical host, is a physical 
server that contains hardware and virtualization layer soft-
ware for hosting virtual machines. Hypervisors use existing 
physical resources and present them to virtual machines 
through the virtualization layer. Virtualization is neither 
simulation nor emulation. To share resources, hypervisor 
runs in a native mode, directly representing the physical 
hardware. Additionally, hypervisors effectively monitor and 
administer shared resources given to any virtual machine. 
Groups of similar hypervisors may be organized into clus-
ters. Clusters allow for aggregation of computing resources 
in the virtual environment and allow for more sophisticated 
architectures. Typically, specific software manages a cluster 
of hypervisors. 
  
C. Network Configurations 
 
 Virtual datacenters, like traditional datacenters, require 
network infrastructure. A hypervisor can use multiple net-
work interface cards (NICs) to provide connectivity. In fact, 
it is highly recommended that several NICs be used for a 
single hypervisor in order to separate networks and various 
functions. Furthermore, as virtualization of I/O devices takes 
off, the IT industry will see another sharp turn towards fewer 
cables, NICs and other devices. Each Ethernet adapter can 
be configured with its own IP address and MAC address 
manually or automatically. A hypervisor or a virtual ma-
chine can be configured with one or more virtual NICs to 
access different physical or virtual networks (see Figure 4). 
 
 Virtual switches allow virtual machines to communicate 
with each other using normal TCP/IP protocols without us-
ing additional physical network resources internal to hyper-
visor. Virtual switches may be configured to have the same 
functionality as a physical switch, with the exception that 
direct interconnection between virtual switches is not avail-
able in some configurations. 
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Figure 4: Hypervisor and virtual machine networking 
 
D. Network Storage 
 
 Most datacenters rely heavily on Fiber Channel SAN, 
iSCSI arrays, and NAS arrays for network storage needs. 
Servers use these technologies to access shared storage net-
works. Storage arrays are shared among computer resources 
enabling essential virtualization technologies such as live 
migration of virtual computers and increased levels of utili-
zation and flexibility. Within a virtual datacenter, network 
storage devices may be virtualized in order to provide dis-
tributed shared access among virtual machines. Moreover, it 
is recommended that files containing the virtual machines be 
placed on shared storage. This is because most current virtu-
alization server products will not support a live migration of 
a virtual machine from one physical server to another physi-
cal server if the virtual machine is located on a storage area 
that is not accessible by all hypervisors. 
 
 Several options are available for the creation of datastores 
such as NAS, SAN, local storage, etc. Shared network stor-
age is an essential component for any virtual infrastructure, 
and applying different storage technologies typically re-
quires a balance between cost and performance. But regard-
less of whether it is a NAS or SAN array, securing network 
storage should always be at the top of the security policy for 
any datacenter. It is critical to separate network storage traf-
fic from virtual machine traffic. 
 
Virtualization Security Threats 
  
 In this section, the security threats to a datacenter’s key 
components in a virtualized environment are discussed. 
 
A. Virtual Machine Threats 
 
 It is a common misconception that the security risks of 
virtual machines are much higher than those of physical 
computers. Virtual machines have the same, if not fewer, 
levels of security risks as their physical-computer counter-
parts. This is due to the fact that physical connectivity, soft-
ware updates and networking employ the same logical infra-
structure. The key difference lies in the fact that VMs are 
running on top of a virtualization layer instead of the actual 
hardware. Virtual machines should be protected by antivirus 
software and should be patched on a regular basis just like 
any physical computer. However, there are several virtual-
ization-specific threats that require the attention of datacen-
ter administrators: 
 
1) Suspended Virtual Machines. When a virtual machine 
is not running, users typically assume there are no security 
threats since the VM is powered off. Throughout tests in our 
lab environment, an observation was made that un-patched 
and unprotected Windows 2000 Servers, running in an ear-
lier version of a virtualized product, were actually infected 
by the Blaster Worm even when a VM was not running. To 
make matters worse, it was able to duplicate itself and infil-
trate other unprotected suspended virtual Windows 2000 
Servers. It was felt that the problem was due to security 
flaws in how the virtualized networking environment was 
implemented, but there were no validated hypotheses gener-
ated. Another observation was made regarding a virtual ma-
chine running as a DHCP server that continued to hand out 
IP addresses even when it was powered off. It is important 
then to realize that suspended virtual machines should not be 
ignored as security targets in virtual datacenter environ-
ments.  
 
2) Resource Contention. When multiple virtual machines 
run on the same physical server, they will inevitably be 
competing for hardware resources such as CPUs, RAMs, 
I/O, and network. Additionally, all of the server and client 
operating system updates are typically applied at the exact 
same time. When multiple virtual machines demand the 
same physical resources simultaneously, they may cause 
performance degradation across the datacenter and could 
even lead to some virtual machines not being able to power 
on. VM-specific countermeasures must be utilized to allevi-
ate resource contention among virtual machines. 
 
 3) VM Sprawl. With the help of current virtualization 
products, the creation of new VMs is quick and easy. It is a 
common malpractice that whenever there is a need for a cer-
tain service, a dedicated VM is immediately created. It then 
becomes a problem noted as VM Sprawl, where too many 
virtual machines are created without careful planning, man-
agement and service consolidation [9].  The biggest threat 
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associated with VM sprawl could be the cost of resources: 
storage space, CPU and RAM resources may become scarce 
and additional software licenses and network service may be 
required. From a security of point of view, if a virtual data-
center is abused by the creation and deployment of unneces-
sary virtual machines, the entire infrastructure may become 
too complex to manage, thereby posing a dangerous, unse-
cure environment. And if any virtual machine is not care-
fully protected or it is placed on a wrong network, it may put 
the entire virtual datacenter in jeopardy. 
 
B. Hypervisor Threats 
 
 Hypervisor is a thin layer that runs directly on top of the 
physical hardware and provides isolation between different 
virtual machines that run on the same physical server. It is, 
therefore, vital to protect hypervisor from being compro-
mised or attacked. Anything happening at the hypervisor 
level is not visible to virtual machines and will eventually 
render the traditional OS hardening or protection techniques 
completely useless. Lately, a number of interesting research 
efforts have been made to address the possible security 
threats to hypervisors: 
 
1) Virtual-Machine-Based Rootkit (VMBR). Samuel T. 
King et al. [11] developed proof-of-concept VMBRs that can 
be inserted underneath the targeting virtual machines if an 
attacker gains administrative privileges on a virtual machine. 
Once the rootkit is successfully installed and configured, it 
functions as a modified hypervisor on the infected physical 
server and loads all virtual machines. As a result, an attacker 
will have a great possibility of controlling every virtual ma-
chine that runs on that hypervisor. 
 
2) Blue Pill Attack. Joanna Rutkowsaka [6] presented a 
highly sophisticated attack at the 2006, annual Black Hat 
Conference. The basic idea of a Blue Pill attack is to exploit 
the AMD64 SVM virtualization instruction sets—code name 
Pacifica. If the attack is successful at the chip level, it will 
also install its own hypervisor to intercept the communica-
tion between virtual servers and the hardware. The author 
also claimed that it is quite likely that similar attacks can be 
implemented against Intel’s VT-x instruction sets—code  
name Vanderpool. Unlike VMBRs, the Blue Pill attack can 
be installed on the fly without modifying the BIOS, and 
there are no noticeable performance penalties associated 
with the attack. As a result, it becomes extremely difficult to 
detect such types of attacks. 
 
C. Virtual Infrastructure Threats 
 
 Virtual infrastructures with clusters of hypervisors are 
highly sensitive to internal attacks. Frequently, the response 
to internal threats is such that “nothing can be done”. That is 
exactly the reason why internal attacks still exist. If there are 
no preventive measures that are taken towards internal 
threats, then internal attacks should be expected. Specifi-
cally, the following security threats should be addressed: 
 
 1) Single Point of Control. A single administrator may be 
implementing permissions, authentications and privileges to 
cluster-wide environments of hypervisors, or virtual centers. 
Such a person becomes the biggest threat to the company’s 
assets, should this super administrator become dissatisfied 
with the company for any reason.  
 
 2) Physical Access. If a person gains physical access to a 
hypervisor, the damage could be much worse because the 
entire virtual infrastructure can quickly be copied, modified 
or even removed. 
 
 3) Licensing Server. Typical virtualization server prod-
ucts are activated and unlocked by the presence of valid li-
cense files. If for any reason the license server fails, IT ad-
ministrators should respond as quickly as possible to get the 
license server back online. Otherwise, when the grace period 
expires—for some vendors this can be 14 days—certain fea-
tures will be disabled, leading to a chaotic environment in 
the datacenter. 
 
D. Virtual Network Threats 
 
 From a design point of view, there are no essential differ-
ences between virtual and physical networking. If network 
administrators have proven networking skills in dealing with 
physical networks, there should be no problem in designing 
virtual networking for VMs and hypervisors. The major 
challenges are the capabilities of security tools and sound 
designs of network configurations. 
 
 1) Security Tools. Conventional networking security 
tools, such as Intrusion Detection System (IDS), Intrusion 
Prevention System (IPS), are typically running on a physical 
network and are able to check all of the traffic coming in and 
out of the area being monitored. They are not capable of 
examining traffic flowing through internal virtual switches 
within hypervisors. 
 
 2) Configuration Tools. Configurations of physical net-
works can be easily designed by using well-established tools 
and techniques. But configurations of virtual networks are 
not easily accessible to network and security professionals 
making it difficult to validate network designs. In fact, Kim 
[7] pointed out that a major security risk associated with 
virtualization is incorrect configuration. It is essential to 
have a set of best practices in place to ensure that virtual 
switches and virtual networks are appropriately configured. 
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Countermeasures 
 
 This section provides practical solutions for hardening 
virtualized environments. 
  
A. Hardening Virtual Machines 
 
 From a security point of view, virtual machines should be 
protected just like physical computers. Antivirus applica-
tions should be installed and patches should be applied as 
often as required for physical machines, even if some of 
those virtual machines remain suspended most of the time, 
i.e., VMs serving as templates.  If applicable, it is better to 
patch templates and then deploy VMs from templates than 
patching each VM individually. There should also be a clear 
organizational policy set up to dictate when to create a new 
virtual machine so that VM-sprawl problems can be miti-
gated. Additionally, it is a good idea to schedule tasks from 
hypervisors for each virtual machine to conduct a full system 
security scan or a full system backup. It is also advisable to 
schedule such tasks in a staged manner or during times when 
physical resources are not heavily utilized. 
 
B. Protecting Hypervisors 
 
 A hypervisor is the foundation of a datacenter and a vir-
tual machine. It must be properly protected from attacks; 
otherwise, virtual machines will not be able to detect any 
illegal behavior happening underground.  One of the current 
trends in securing hypervisors is to validate them under the 
framework of trusted computing. It is advisable to check the 
integrity of a hypervisor before it can be trusted and de-
ployed [3]. The main challenge here is that trusted comput-
ing works only if the underlying hardware, such as CPUs 
and chipsets, supports Trusted Platform Modules (TPM). 
 
 Thus far, no significant security threats directly targeting 
hypervisors have been discovered. This does not mean that 
current hypervisor implementations are protected. Attacks 
on hypervisors tend to be much more difficult than attacking 
the virtual machines. To counter theoretical attacks such as 
Subvirt and Blue-Pill threats described earlier more secured 
virtualization implementations at the chipset level are 
needed from both Intel and AMD. Another possible solution 
is to make the hypervisor very thin so that it is easier to vali-
date and can be pre-installed onto the hardware components 
with read-only capabilities (BIOS-like approach). 
 
 
 
C. Securely Managing Virtual  
Infrastructure 
 
 An effective security policy is a must for any datacenter, 
whether virtualized or physical. Several levels of permis-
sions can be set in a datacenter. Such levels include datacen-
ter, virtual center, host and virtual–machine, and are repre-
sented in Figure 5. The following suggestions are particu-
larly important to enhance the security of virtual infrastruc-
tures: 
 1) Separate Permissions. To alleviate the problem of the 
single point of control, the super administrator, it is best to 
separate permission policies as the following example indi-
cates [10]: 
 
• Administrator 1 (A1) may reinstall hypervisor OS; 
• Administrator 2 (A2) may specify networking for hy-
pervisors and VMs; 
• Administrator 3 (A3) may deploy VMs without per-
missions to modify VMs’ local user access and 
group policies; 
• Administrator 4 (A4) manages the distribution of 
physical resources for a datacenter; and 
• A1, A2, A3 and A4 work together as a group to spec-
ify administrative tasks for a datacenter. 
 
 
Figure 5. Levels of permissions and privileges in a virtualized 
datacenter 
 
 2) Physical Access. Physical access to a datacenter is es-
sential: bad practices such as easily accessed codes, access 
cards and even open doors should be prevented at all times.  
 3) Protecting Licensing Servers. In an enterprise virtual 
datacenter environment, it is necessary to protect the avail-
ability of the licensing server. One solution may be imple-
menting a redundant licensing server.    
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 4) Securing VM Management Console. If an attacker 
gains control of a virtual server management console, either 
locally or remotely, all hypervisors and VMs that they man-
age are easily compromised. 
  
D. Protecting Virtual and  
Physical Networks 
 
 There are crucial steps to be taken when designing a net-
work for a virtualized environment. The following list repre-
sents the minimum requirements for configuring networks in 
virtualized datacenters: 
 
1. Hypervisor management traffic or service console traffic 
must be restricted and separated from other networks such 
as virtual machine network, storage (if applicable), etc. 
2. Network storage traffic must be separated from virtual 
machine networks. In other words, network storage access 
needs to be configured at the hypervisor level, where only 
the hypervisor has the ability to access datastores and 
grant access to datastores for VMs. Additionally, SAN 
administrators need to coordinate access control for hy-
pervisors within datacenters (LUN masking, zoning and 
others). Most successful secure implementations of Fiber 
Channel SAN include both hard and soft zoning. 
3. Setting security policies on virtual switches is important. 
Third-party virtual network switches can be used to ex-
pand network security. 
4. VLAN tagging may be a good option in a limited network 
resources environment. 
 
 Figure 6 depicts a network configuration example for hy-
pervisors. 
 
 
Figure 6. Separation of network Traffic (without VLANs) 
 
E. Recent Virtualization-Aware Security 
Technologies 
 
 Virtualization vendors have recently begun to offer a set 
of Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) to end users 
and third-party IT companies. The availability of the hyper-
visor-level APIs creates an opportunity to build a virtualiza-
tion-aware security framework because it has the potential to 
monitor resource usage at both virtual-machine level and 
physical-machine level. It also makes it possible to examine 
network traffic passing through the virtual machines and 
virtual-network interfaces.  An overview of such a security 
platform is shown in Figure 7, where a dedicated security 
VM is shown being created in a virtual datacenter.  
 
 
Figure 7. A model for virtualization security with hypervisor 
level APIs 
 
This security VM will be loaded with many security tech-
nologies/products such as firewall, Intrusion Detection Sys-
tem (IDS), Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) and anti-virus 
agents, etc.  
 
 The security VM will communicate with the APIs to col-
lect security-related information about each single virtual 
OS. As a result, it is possible to run a single antivirus agent 
on the security VM to fully scan multiple virtual VMs. Since 
hypervisor-level APIs can provide network visibility at the 
virtual-switch level, traditional firewall and IDS/IPS prod-
ucts can be installed inside the Security VM to protect the 
virtual datacenter just like they are protecting physical serv-
ers.  It is the authors’ belief that those hypervisor-level APIs 
can allow the IT industry to quickly arm their virtual data-
centers with conventional security tools. 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
 The current state of virtualization technologies is not more 
vulnerable than physical servers, but the damage to a virtual-
ized datacenter could be much quicker and more severe than 
providing services in separate physical environments. How-
ever, virtualization technologies present both opportunities 
and risks. When virtualizing datacenters, all personnel 
should be involved: server administration teams, networking 
teams, security, development and management. There should 
be no difference between protecting VMs and physical com-
puters. 
 
 The following may be used as the best practices to en-
hance virtualization security: 
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1. Create an effective security policy for the virtualized envi-
ronment. 
2. Define trusted zones and separate servers either at the 
hardware level or at a VM level. 
3. Eliminate single point of control - use separation policies 
for datacenter administrators. 
4. Employ a separation policy for hypervisor administrators 
and VM administrators. 
5. Enforce extremely strict control for virtual center permis-
sions and privileges. 
6. In hypervisor cluster settings, provide high availability for 
license servers and virtual centers – have a primary and a 
backup copy of Virtual Center and License servers. 
7. If no I/O virtualization is deployed, separate physical net-
works for management and administration of hypervisors, 
storage, and virtual machines. 
8. Disable/remove all unnecessary or superfluous functions 
and virtual hardware. 
9. Prevent virtual machines from utilizing physical resources 
- do not create and use extra virtual devices such as CPUs, 
media drives, RAM; never over-allocate any physical re-
sources as this leads to resource-contention problems.  
10. Deploy virtual security appliances such as virtual 
IPS/IDS systems, firewalls, antivirus agents and others in 
virtualized datacenters. 
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